Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2009

Michael Ward v. Caroline Coats Graydon : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bryce D. Panzar; Blackburn and Stoll; Brad C. Smith; Stevenson and Smith.
Craig S. Cook.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Ward v. Graydon, No. 2009714 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1418

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL WARD,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee,
vs.

CAROLINE COATS GRAYDON,
Defendant and Appellee,

Appellate No. 2009714-CA
District Court No. 080903379

and
PETER COATS,
Defendant, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PETER COATS

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg

BRYCE D. PANZER, No. 2509
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC
Attorney for Respondent-Appellee
Caroline Coats Graydon
257 East 200 South, Ste. 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
BRAD C. SMITH, NO. 6656
STEVENSON & SMITH, PC
Attorney for Plaintiff, Appellant
Cross-Appellee Michael C. Ward
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, Utah 84403

CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713
Attorney for Appellee and
Cross-Appellant Peter Coats
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Telephone: (801)485-8123

RL

ED

UTAH APPELLATE COURS E 1 3 2010

TABL1 OI CONTENTS
Page
JURISDICTION.

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRE SEN i >
ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

NATURE OF THE CASE

2

PROCEEDINGS BELOW

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

7

POINT I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PETER ON THE
SOLE BASIS THAT HE HAD "DEFAULTED" BY NOT
FILING ANY RESPONSIVE MEMORANDA OR AFFTD A VMS
POINT 11. HIE UND1SPU1ED FACTS AGREED
UPON BY ALL PARTIES INCLUDING PETER
DO NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY LIABILITY OF
PETER FOR HIS CONDUCT IN THE HAGEN
REAL ESTATE OFFER
POINT III. 11 IE LOWER COUR1 ERRED IN
FAILING TO GRANT RULE 59(A)(6) RELIEF
FROM ITS PRIOR ENTRY OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN SO DOING.
('(>N('LUSI( )N

7

"7
'

ADDENDUM

i

CASES CITED
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange,
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1992)

2

Coulter and Smith v. Russell,
976P.2d 1218, 1221 (UtahApp. 1999)

2

Davis v. Grand County Service Area,
905 P.2d 888 (Utah 1995)

19

Peats v. Commercial Banks,
6P.2d 1191 (UtahApp. 1987)

19

Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co.,
676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984)

10

Hansen v. Stewart,
761 P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1988)

20

Lach v. Deseret Book,
746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1987)

9

Lamb v. B & B Amusement Corp..
869 P.2d 926 (Utah 1993)

10

McCorvey v. State Dep't. of Transportation,
868 P.2d 41, 44 (Utah 1993)

18

Moonlight Electric Assn. v. Oquirrh Systems, Inc.,
767P.2d 125, 127 (Utah App. 1988)

17

Orton v. Carter.
970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)

1, 2

Orvis v. Johnson,
177 P.3d 600, 601 (Utah 2008)

11

Saltis v. Afflect,
105 P.2d 176 (Utah 1940)

19

Scott v. Major,
980 P.2d 214 (Utah App. 1999)

9

u

Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son,
808 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Utah 1991)

18

Wilcox v. Anchor Water Co.,
164 P.3d 355 (Utah 2007)

9

Winters v. Schulman,
977P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah App. 1999)

1

STATUTES CITED
Rule 7, U.R.C.P
Rule 56, U.R.C.P
Rule 59, U.R.C.P
Rule 60, U.R.C.P

9
9, 12
2, 16, 17, 19
2, 16

Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103

1

Utah R. App. T. 3(a)

1

24(i), U.R.A.P

3

in

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by defendant Peter Coats ("Peter") from the August 17,
2009 Summary Judgment Order and the December 10, 2009 Order denying posttrial relief issued by Judge Denise Lindberg. Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is
conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103
and Utah R. App. T. 3(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue on Appeal No. 1: Did the lower court err in granting Summary
Judgment against Peter on the sole basis that he had "defaulted by filing no
opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (emphasis added)." Does
the failure to respond to a opposing party's motion for summary judgment
automatically allow a court to enter judgment against the non-moving party
regardless of the merits of the moving party's motion for summary judgment?
Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a question of law reviewed by
appellate courts for "correctness." Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1221
(Utah App. 1999). "Correctness" means that no particular deference is given to
the trial court's ruling on questions of law. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256
(Utah 1998).
Issue on Appeal No. 2: When the facts are undisputed, does the trial court
have an independent obligation to determine if the underlying claim of the moving
party is sufficient, as a matter of law, in which to enter judgment against the non1

moving party? Specifically, was Peter's mere refusal to place all proceeds from
the sale of the property into a escrow desired by Appellee Caroline Graydon
(Caroline) a sufficient reason to find him liable for the failed real estate sale and
assess him over $300,000 in damages? Whether a party is entitled to summary
judgment is a question of law reviewed by appellate courts for "correctness".
Coulter and Smith v. Russell 976 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah App. 1999).
"Correctness" means that no particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling
on questions of law. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998).
Issue on Appeal No. 3: Did the trial court err in failing to grant postjudgment relief pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure when
there was insufficient evidence to find Peter liable for over $300,000 damages
simply because he refused to place the proceeds of the sale in an escrow account
demanded by Caroline? The question as to post-trial rulings by a lower court are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard which requires no reasonable basis
for the decision and so unreasonable that it be classified as arbitrary and capricious
or a clear abuse of discretion. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 938
(Utah 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Peter does not believe any constitutional provisions; statutes or rules are
determinative in this matter.
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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the Third District Court, the
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg presiding, finding in favor of Appellant Michael
Ward (Michael) and against Peter in a dispute involving the proposed sale of Salt
Lake County real property owned jointly by Peter and Michael.
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Peter adopts by
reference the Statement of the Case made in Caroline's Brief page 4.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to Rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Peter adopts the
Statement of Facts contained in Caroline's Brief, pages 5-12 with the following
exception:
Although there was an order in the divorce action that prohibited
Coats and Graydon from disposing of or encumbering marital assets,
Gray don had reason to fear that Coats would violate the court order if he
received the proceeds of sale. This was because Coats had violated the
court's order before, by encumbering the marital home and by placing
encumbrances and easements against the North and South Parcels. These
facts, in part, were the basis for POA Order entered by Judge Lindquist in
the divorce action. R. 311-12 fl[7). (Caroline's Brief, p. 10).
Peter would indicate that while there had been prior historic disputes during the
long litigation of the divorce action, the divorce court judges had imposed strict
prohibition against Peter encumbering or liquidating any of the potential marital
property and therefore any current wTear" that Caroline had of such dissipation was
completely misplaced and unjustified.
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Peter adopts by reference the entire "Corrected Statement of Facts"
contained in Michael's Reply Brief, pages 1-6.
The undisputed facts occurring in this particular lawsuit have been well
described by both parties in their briefs and therefore Peter has no need to repeat
them. However, it is relevant to understand one of the issues in the parallel
divorce action between Peter and Caroline. In the Third District Court Case No.
014902286 between Caroline Hayes Graydon and Peter Coats, Judge Atherton in
November of 2008 found Peter in contempt of court for failing to respond to
discovery and therefore ordered his Answer struck and a Default entered. The
Supplemental Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were
prepared solely by Caroline's attorney with no input or opposition from Peter. A
judgment in the amount of $523,508 was entered in Caroline's favor against Peter
for Peter's alleged interference with the David Hagen sale of the property. This is
the same sale that forms the basis of Michael's lawsuit against both Peter and
Caroline in the instant case.
This award was appealed to this Court in Case No. 20080992. Peter
contended that even in a default situation the lower court had an obligation to
examine the evidence before entering a judgment against him and that there was
no evidence of his liability because of this failed sale. Both Michael and Caroline
have referred to Caroline's award of $500,000 in their various briefs. A copy of
the pertinent portion of Peter's Appellant Brief is contained in the Addendum to
this Brief.
4

Because of an outstanding attorney fee issue, this Court dismissed the
appeal, without prejudice, and remanded the case for a lower court hearing. Judge
Atherton has scheduled this matter for September 9, 2010. Once this hearing has
been held and a final judgment entered, Peter will once again appeal the
underlying divorce judgment including this award of over $500,000 to Caroline
based upon the failed Hagen sale.
In any event, any argument made in this appeal by either Michael or
Caroline based upon the $500,000 + judgment in the underlying divorce action is
tenuous at best and should not be relied upon in the instant case until such
judgment becomes final.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Peter did not think it necessary to retain legal counsel in the lower court
when his nephew Michael brought this action against him. Peter did not participate
in any of the briefing concerning the cross motions for summary judgment. Upon
learning of the oral argument, Peter attended the hearing and spoke to the Court
regarding his understanding and concerns. The lower court essentially ruled that
Peter had "defaulted" by failing to file any responsive pleadings or affidavits to
the motions for summary judgment and therefore granted Michael's judgment
against him for over $300,000. This "default" justification was contained in the
written Order.
Peter contends that the lower court erred in solely basing its decision upon
his failure to respond. There is no rule of civil procedure requiring a party to
5

respond to a motion for summary judgment nor is there a "default" penalty defined
for such failure. Instead, the law is clear that the moving party has the burden to
show that there is no material dispute of facts and, as a matter of law, the moving
party should prevail. Thus, the burden was upon Michael to produce sufficient
evidence and arguments in order for summary judgment to be granted. Whether
Peter responded or not is immaterial to Michael's burden. It is analogous to a
criminal defendant remaining silent while the state must prove its case. It was
therefore error to grant summary judgment merely because Peter did not file any
responsive documents.
2. Peter contends that even if the undisputed material facts are viewed most
favorably to Michael, he is unable to prevail against Peter as a matter of law. To
do so, the lower court would have to find that Peter violated some type of duty to
Michael relating to the attempted purchase of the North Parcel by Mr. Hagen. The
facts show otherwise. The Hagen offer was conditioned upon obtaining a
quitclaim deed from Caroline in order to remove her cloud of title. Caroline
refused to do so unless all proceeds from the sale were placed in a special escrow
account administered by the divorce court. Peter was not obligated by court order
to do so and therefore refused. Caroline consequently refused to sign a quitclaim
deed and this failure resulted in the sale's demise.
Michael has cited no authority requiring Peter, as a matter of law, to
establish the desired escrow of Caroline in order to persuade her to release her
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interest. Without such an underlying duty there can be no liability on the part of
Peter for this failed sale.
3. Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a new trial may be
granted (or a summary judgment vacated) if the court finds the evidence
insufficient to justify the verdict or other decision or that it is against law. (Rule
59(a)(6)). The lower court erred in failing to vacate its prior judgment based upon
the insufficiency of the evidence that Peter was responsible for the failed sale.
The mere fact that Peter refused to establish an escrow in accordance with
Caroline's wishes does not make Peter liable to Michael.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST PETER ON THE
SOLE BASIS THAT HE HAD "DEFAULTED" BY NOT
FILING ANY RESPONSIVE MEMORANDA OR AFFIDAVITS.
On July 20, 2009 a hearing was held before the lower court as to the
various motions for summary judgment filed by the parties. Michael had filed
dual motions for summary judgment against Peter and Caroline. Caroline filed a
motion for summary judgment against Michael. Peter, on the other hand, had filed
no motions nor had he responded to those of the other parties with either
memoranda or affidavits.
Peter attended this hearing and requested to speak on his own behalf. The
following dialogue occurred between Peter and the lower court:
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MR. COATS:

Your Honor, if I may go ahead.

THE COURT:

Okay. Well, actually, Mr. Coats, you effectively defaulted on
this matter. You never responded to this motion. You never
indicated that you were even going to appear today. I'm not
really sure what it is that you would be adding by way of oral
argument because frankly neither side has had the opportunity
to receive or prepare for any argument that you might make
today. That is essentially an ambush of both sides. Neither
of them have the opportunity to consider any argument that
you might make today because you chose not to file any
response.
* * *

MR. COATS:

If I may have a little bit of leeway on this?

THE COURT:

Okay.
(Tr. Hearing July 20, 2009, pp. 21-2).

Subsequently, the court made the following ruling at the conclusion of the
hearing.
So I am—I think that I'm still where I started out, the Summary
Judgment should be granted for Ms. Gray don and denied as against Ms.
Graydon as to Mr. Coats. Mr. Coats"' failure to respond to the motions
really I think put counsel at a disadvantage here today, but I think that it
was important to give Mr. Coats at least the opportunity to create a record
of his position. But as against Mr. Coats because I am reading your motion
as being a motion as against both defendants that the lack of opposition or
even Mr. Coats' statement here today I don't believe are sufficient to defeat
your Motion for Summary Judgment as against Mr. Coats. Okay. So I am
granting the summary judgment as to Mr. Coats. Id. at 31-32.
On August 17, 2009 the Court executed its "Order on Summary Judgment
Motions and Judgment". As pertains to Peter, the Court stated:
On the ground that defendant Peter Coats defaulted by filing no
opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, said Motion is
hereby granted as against defendant Peter Coats. Accordingly, Judgment is
hereby granted in favor of plaintiff Michael Ward and against defendant
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Peter Coats in the sum of $315,242.72 together with interest thereon at the
post-judgment rate of 2.4% per annum. .. Costs are awarded to plaintiff
Michael Ward and against defendant Peter Coats. (R. 322).
In essence, the lower court granted judgment of over $300,000 against
Peter because Peter failed to file any response to the summary judgment motion of
Michael. The lower court termed this as a "default" in terms of the summary
judgment proceeding. The lower court committed reversible error in this
characterization and in its analysis.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is only appropriate when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. Wilcox v. Anchor Water Co. 164 P.3d 355 (Utah
2007). Summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear from
undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail. Lach v. Deseret Book,
746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1987).
Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides an orderly method in
which a motion for summary judgment may be made. Subsection c (3)(A) and (B)
outlines the form in which the moving party's memoranda and affidavit should
take and discusses the opposing party's memoranda and affidavit. By following
this procedure a trial court can easily see the agreed and disputed facts and areas
of law by both parties.
If the non-moving party chooses not to file counter-affidavits or other
evidence disputing the facts of the moving party, the facts of the moving party are
considered to be undisputed. Scott v. Major, 980 P.2d 214 (Utah App. 1999). On
9

the other hand, even if the opposing party fails to file an affidavit, summary
judgment will still be denied if the affidavit of the moving party shows on its face
that there is a material issue of fact still present. Frisbee v. K & K Construction
Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984).
In the instant case because Peter did not file any counter affidavits to the
summary judgment motion of Michael, it can be assumed that Peter did not
dispute any of the material facts relied upon by Michael in his motion. The
substance of these facts is not important here but will be discussed in the next
section relating to the specific legal theory required by Michael to prevail. The
only question that remains germane to this section of Peter's Brief is whether the
complete failure to respond to Michael's motion allows a "default" to be entered
by the lower court against him.
It is fundamental that the parties moving for summary judgment must
establish the right to such judgment based on applicable law as applied to the
undisputed material issues of fact. Lamb v. B & B Amusement Corp., 869 P.2d
926 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court in a recent decision clarified the
burden and obligations of parties in summaiy judgment proceedings and reversed
both the trial court and this Court's affirmance of a motion for summary judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court stated:
A summary judgment movant must show both that there is no
material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Where the moving party would bear the
burden of proof at trial, the movant must establish each element of his
claim in order to show that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
10

order to meet his initial burden on summary judgment, therefore, Orvis
must present evidence sufficient to establish that judicial estoppel is
appropriate under the facts of the case, and that no material issue of fact
remains. The burden on summary judgment then shifts to the non-moving
party to identify contested material facts, or legal flaws in the application of
judicial estoppel. Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 600, 601 (Utah
2008)(emphasis added).
Thus, viewing the instant case in the abstract only, it is clear that a nonmoving party cannot '"default" his opponent's motion for summary judgment since
to permit such doctrine would negate the requirement that the moving party must
show both that there is no material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. In other words, the actions or inactions of the nonmoving party should not affect the validity of the motion for summary judgment
and the analysis that must be made by the trial court as to whether it should be
granted based upon the sole efforts of the moving party.
This burden is no different than what occurs in a criminal case. The state
has the burden to prove guilt of an accused. The defendant is not required to take
the stand and negate the accusation of the state. The prosecutor in a criminal case
can have his case dismissed as a matter of law without a defendant having to do
anything if the prosecutor fails to meet his initial burden of proof. Here, the
requirement is no different.
A simple example of this summary judgment requirement illustrates this
principle. Assume that this litigation involves a car accident between Michael and
Peter. Michael files an affidavit that states that he was driving through an

11

intersection in which Peter was waiting and that Michael proceeded into the
intersection against the red light crashing into Peter.
Michael moves for summary judgment on the basis that the facts of the
accident are undisputed. Peter files no counter affidavits because he also agrees to
this set of facts. Under the lower court's reasoning, Michael would be awarded
summary judgment as a matter of law even though his "facts" shows that he is
legally liable for running the red light in violation of applicable law. In reality,
however, under the Utah Supreme Court standard the lower court must look at
these claims and conclude the even though the facts are undisputed they do not
support Michael's claim of liability against Peter and therefore must be denied
even though Peter filed no opposing motion or papers.
Had the Utah State Legislature intended that the mere non-response to a
summary judgment be fatal to a litigant, it would have so provided in the rules just
as it has done for litigants who fail to answer complaints. Instead, Rule 56 was
designed to short cut litigation when additional litigation is not required. It does
not eliminate the burdens and requirements of the various parties under this
shortened procedure.
Thus, the lower court's conclusion that Peter had "defaulted" by his failure
to respond is incorrect as a matter of law and must be reversed.

12

POINT II
THE UNDISPUTED CONDUCT OF PETER DURING THE
HAGAN OFFER DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY
LIABILITY TO MICHAEL MERELY BECAUSE
THE SALE FAILED

As noted supra, merely because facts are shown to be undisputed does not
automatically entitle a moving party to a judgment against a non-moving party.
The second hurdle that must be jumped by a summary judgment movant is a
showing that the undisputed facts equate to liability as a matter of law. If there is
no liability based upon such facts then there can be no judgment against the nonmoving party.
In the instant case, both Michael and Caroline filed various supporting
memoranda and affidavits explaining and detailing the circumstances of the Hagen
offer and its subsequent failure. Michael and Caroline vigorously disagreed as to
the legal duty and status of Caroline concerning the property and her failure to
agree to a quitclaim deed. However, both the parties agreed entirely as to the
sequence of facts that prevented the $5,200,000 sale from occurring.
Both Michael and Caroline acknowledge that Peter and Michael accepted
the offer made by David Hagen after having made a counter offer involving
several conditions; including the requirement that Caroline quitclaim her interest
in the property. This requirement was added because Caroline had filed various
encumbering documents including a lis pendens against the property. Both parties
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agree that Caroline was not on the title to the property and was not a party to the
sales contract with Mr. Hagen.
The undisputed facts also show that Caroline demanded that the proceeds
of the sale, after proper deductions, be placed in an escrow account established by
the divorce court until the divorce was final. Caroline maintained that she was
concerned Peter would dissipate the funds prior to the divorce being final if such
an escrow was not established.
All parties and the undisputed material facts show that Peter refused to
agree to such an escrow based on his belief that he was entitled to manage the
proceeds himself as long as he did not dissipate or hide any assets as had been
prohibited by several divorce court orders.
Consequentially, therefore, Peter would not agree to put the proceeds in an
escrow; Caroline would not agree to quitclaim her interest in the property without
the escrow; and without the quitclaim deed of Caroline, the sale to Hagen failed.
Michael argued that Caroline was under a legal obligation to release her
liens on the property since she did not have a title interest and was not entitled to
any of the property proceeds until the divorce court awarded it. The lower court
disagreed with this assessment and held that Caroline was under no obligation to
sign a quitclaim deed to the property and was therefore, as a matter of law, not
liable for the failed sale.
The correctness of this ruling is now the main event in the instant appeal
between Michael and Caroline as contained in their respective briefs previously
14

filed with this Court. If this Court finds that Caroline was obligated to clear the
title that she had encumbered, then her liability for the failed sale becomes
actionable again. If, on the other hand, she had no legal obligation to give Peter,
Michael, and Mr. Hagen a quitclaim deed then there can be no liability on her part
for failing to do so.
Regardless of the dispute between Michael and Caroline in this appeal, the
undisputed evidence in the record by both of these parties shows that Peter's only
claimed transgression was his failure to agree to a court-run escrow in accordance
with Caroline's wishes. Neither of the parties has cited any authority requiring
Peter to have done so. Peter was, in fact, completely within his rights to demand
the full proceeds of the sale of his property be paid to him so that he could manage
the funds pending any division by the divorce court. He was not obligated to put
the funds into any escrow desired by Caroline.
His complete right to reject the escrow prior to foreclosure is even better
seen in light of Caroline's subsequent effort to capture the proceeds after the
foreclosure sale. In a hearing to determine the distribution of the proceeds by the
trustee, Judge Trease ordered that all funds be released in their entirety to Peter
subject to any subsequent order by the divorce court. Judge Trease stated the
following
Regarding the second argument, then, by Ms. Gray don, that she has
priority over these funds based on her marital interest, I don't agree with
that as well and deny her claim, then, under that argument as well. I
think—I'm convinced that Ms. Gray don does not have a statutory interest.
And although she may have an interest in the future, certainly, or a claim on
15

these funds by virtue of the divorce that is ongoing, I don't think that her
claim places her in priority over Mr. Coats. And secondly, a plain reading
of the statute, I think, requires me to establish priorities of the parties. And
again, as I have indicated, that does not mean that I'm saying that Mr.
Coats gets this money in the clear, so as to speak, if there is a court order
out there that these funds not be disbursed or dissipated pursuant to a
divorce order or a divorce order from the divorce court.
And so, accordingly, I am finding that Mr. Coats has priority over
these funds, subject, of course, to the payment of the amount for attorneys'
fees that Mr. Smith (the trustee) has indicated on the record and will
indicate in the future regarding his appearance in court today. And I'm
ordering that the funds be released in its entirety, subject to payment of Mr.
Smith's attorney's fees, to Mr. Coats. (Civil No. 070906540, December 17,
2007, pp. 8-9).
Caroline, according to the undisputed evidence, made no effort to go to the
divorce court and request that Peter be ordered to establish a court-run escrow
either before or after the foreclosure had occurred. Caroline already had several
separate orders from the divorce court judges and commissioners prohibiting Peter
from liquidating any assets he had or may acquire and may have felt that such an
effort would be futile.
If, however, Caroline had specifically obtained a divorce court order
requiring the proceeds of the Hagan sale be placed in a special escrow, Peter's
position would be completely different since he would then have been under a
legal duty to comply with Caroline's wishes. As to what actually transpired,
however, he was under no duty to either Michael or Caroline to pay his proceeds
into a court-run escrow and exercised his right to so decline. While this decision
causally resulted in Caroline's refusal to quitclaim her interest in the property,
such refusal cannot be traced to Peter's legitimate action.
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Thus, at the time the motion for summary judgment was filed by Michael
there was no liability theory upon which Michael could recover from Peter based
upon Michael's own undisputed facts. Had Peter made a cross-motion for
summary judgment against Michael, the trial court should have granted such
motion. However, in the absence of such motion the lower court should have
denied the motion of Michael and set the matter for trial.
It is respectfully requested that this Court, as a matter of law, reverse the
Summary Judgment entered against Peter and enter judgment in his favor based
upon the uncontested facts and established legal principles.

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT
RULE 59(A)(6) RELIEF FROM ITS PRIOR ENTRY OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
After judgment was entered against Peter on August 17, 2009 he retained
counsel to represent him in further proceedings. On August 31, 2009 Peter's new
counsel filed a Motion for New Trial and/or to Alter or Amend Judgment and a
Motion for Rule 60(b) relief. (R. 326-368).
Peter and Michael briefed the motions and on December 10, 2009 the
Honorable Denise P. Lindberg denied all the motions of Peter. (R. 411-13; see
Addendum to this Brief). Although Judge Lindberg specifically addressed Peter's
claim for relief based upon excusable neglect and surprise which are not raised in
this appeal, she did not specifically deal with Peter's claim that the Summary
17

Judgment was in violation of Rule 59(a)(6): "insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict or other decision; or that it is against law." Judge Lindberg in
her Minute Entry Order stated the following:
On August 31, 2009, Coats, now represented by counsel, filed the
present motion. Plaintiff has opposed the motion and explained why
Coates is not entitled to relief from judgment under either Rule 59 or Rule
60. The Court agrees entirely with the plaintiffs analysis and incorporates
herein by reference. The analysis therein more than adequately supports
the court's determination that Coats' motions fail.
It is well established that a party may file a Rule 59 motion following entry
of a summary judgment even though there has technically been no trial.
Moonlight Electric Assn. v. Oquirrh Systems, Inc., 767 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah App.
1988). See also, Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1066 (Utah
1991) ("on analysis of Rule 59(a) and the rationale behind this leads us to
conclude that such a [Rule 59] motion is, nonetheless, procedurally correct.)
The question as to "insufficiency of the evidence" in a Rule 59 motion
applies the same test utilized by this appellate Court in deciding the insufficiency
of evidence on appeal. To support an insufficiency of the evidence claim "the one
challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and
then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict." McCorvey v. State Dep't. of Transportation, 868 P.2d
41, 44 (Utah 1993). On a motion for a new trial based on an insufficiency of
evidence, the trial court should review the evidence and every reasonable

18

inference fairly drawn from it in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Peats
v. Commercial Banks, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987).
The undisputed evidence in the Rule 59 proceeding is the same undisputed
evidence that was before the lower court in the original Summary Judgment
proceeding. The same arguments previously made in the prior section of this Brief
are applicable here. The only conduct of Peter that Michael and Caroline
complain about in the transaction with Hagen is Peter's refusal to put the money in
escrow thereby causing Caroline to refuse to execute a quitclaim deed.
Peter's action was not unlawful, in breach of contract, or in violation of any
court order. Peter was perfectly entitled to request management of the proceeds
until such time as he was required to do otherwise. He was not required to
appease Caroline in order to satisfy the condition of the real estate contract by
obtaining her quitclaim deed. Thus, the evidence is clearly insufficient that he did
anything intentionally or wrongfully to prevent the sale of the property to Mr.
Hagen.
While a lower court has wide latitude in its discretion as to whether or not it
will give Rule 59 relief, the exercise of judicial discretion must be based upon
some facts justifying its decision. Saltis v. Afflect 105 P.2d 176 (Utah 1940).
Clearly, a new trial should be granted when prejudicial error has occurred or
substantial justice has not been done. Pavis v. Grand County Service Area, 905
P.2d 888 (Utah 1995). Finally, a new trial may be granted under Rule 59
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whenever there is evidence that would have permitted entry of judgment for the
losing party. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1988).
During the original summary judgment proceeding the lower court did not
have the benefit of legal input from Peter since he was not represented by counsel.
However, the Rule 59 proceeding gave the lower court a second chance to
examine the case after careful legal briefing by both counsel for Peter and
Michael. The lower court abused its discretion by failing to correct its prior error
of imposing a judgment of over $3005000 to be entered wrongfully against Peter
based upon "default" alone and in light of the undisputed facts which show no
actionable conduct giving rise to any liability claim.
CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in finding against Peter on the sole basis that he had
"defaulted" by failing to file any responsive pleadings in the summary judgment
proceeding. The lower court did not require Michael to satisfy his burden to show
both undisputed facts and liability as a matter of law.
When the agreed upon facts of all parties are examined in detail they reveal
that Peter did not do any act or fail to perform any act that would make him liable
to Michael for the failed Hagen sale. Peter was entitled to demand that he be
allowed management of the proceeds from the sale and, in spite of Caroline's
opposition, was free to reject a court established escrow.
Finally, the lower court failed to correct its prior error by affirming the
summary judgment against Peter in the Rule 59 proceeding even though the court
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was provided with extensive legal input and authorities from Peter that was not
available during the original hearing.
For these reasons, Peter respectfully requests that this Court vacate the prior
judgment of the lower court and enter judgment of dismissal in his favor.
Dated this 7th Day of September, 2010

Craig S. Caok
Attorney for Peter Coats
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to Brad Smith, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Ward, 3986 Washington
Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401 and to Bryce Panzer, Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
Carolyn Coats Graydon, 257 East 200 South, Suite 800, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 this 7th day of September, 2010.

Craig $./Cook
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ADDENDUM

POINT III
THE FINDING AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER
COURT RELATING TO DAMAGES FROM THE
SALE OF THE "NORTH PARCEL" ARE CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS AND ARE AGAINST THE CLEAR
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
Statement of Applicable Facts
1. Prior to marrying Appellee Caroline. Appellant Peter purchased farmland
located next to the Jordan River for $5,000 an acre on a long-term contract. This has
been referred throughout this lawsuit as the "South Parcel", South Jordan, Utah. (R. 336).
2. Shortly after marrying Appellee Caroline, Appellant Peter purchased
additional land adjoining the original property in order to avoid being landlocked. This
has been referred to as the "North Parcel", South Jordan, Utah. (Id. at 2355).
3. This farmland greatly increased in value throughout the 1990's and through the
real estate boom of 2000 to 2005.
4. On February 13, 2007 an offer was made by David Hagen to purchase the
North Parcel for a purchase price of $5,000,000 with six additional terms. Appellant
Peter made a counter-offer for the amount of $5,200,000 with ten terms and conditions.
The counter-offer was accepted. (Petitioner's Ex. 98 from Oct. 7, 2008 Transcript). (See
Appendix to Brief).
5. After defaulting Appellant Peter, the lower court made Findings of Fact
concerning the North Parcel. The Court found that the property was foreclosed upon and
the trustee's sale netted $3,600,000. The Court further found that "Respondent caused the
prior sales to fail, including one sale of the North Parcel for $5,200,000." (R. 2335).
6. The Court then entered the following Finding:
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21. Because of the foreclosure sale to Respondent's relatives, Petitioner
and Respondent each received only approximately $931,000, for a difference of
$523,580 each, which is the cost that should be assessed to Respondent and paid
to Petitioner as damages for Respondent's dissipation and contempt. The sum
should be paid to Petitioner from the sale of the South Parcel of the South Jordan
property as set forth below in paragraph 26. (R. 2336).
7. The Court then entered a "Supplemental Decree of Divorce" as follows:
16. Due to the foreclosure sale to Respondent's relatives, Petitioner and
Respondent each received approximately $931,000, rather than $1,454,508.30, for
a difference of $523,508, each. That loss and cost shall be assessed to
Respondent and paid to Petitioner as damages for Respondent's dissipation and
contempt. The sum shall be paid to Petitioner from the sale of the South Parcel of
the South Jordan property, as set forth below in paragraph 21. (R. 2349).
ARGUMENT
A.

Utah Law Requires a Showing of Competent Evidence Even Against A
Party in Default.

Utah law requires a litigant who has defaulted the opposing party to nevertheless
produce sufficient evidence to justify a default judgment. Rule 55(b)(2), U.R.C.P.
provides the following:
By the Court. In all cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall
apply to the court therefore. If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or
to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount
of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an
investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings and order
such references as it deems necessary and proper.
The divorce code similarly provides that:
A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise except
upon legal evidence taken in the cause. If the decree is to be entered upon default
of the respondent, evidence to support the decree may be submitted upon the
affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court. U.C.A. §30-3-4 (l)(b).
This Court has enunciated these principles by noting that while a default judgment
establishes, as a matter of law, that a defendant is liable to a plaintiff, nevertheless it is
still incumbent upon the non-defaulting party to establish by competent evidence the
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amount of recoverable damages and costs that are claimed. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has held
that to enter a default judgment for unliquidated damages, a judge must review the
complaint, determine whether the allegations state a valid claim for relief, and award
damages in an amount that is supported by some valid evidence. Skanchy v. Calcados
Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1998). See also, Pierce v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah
1986); Russell v. Martell 681 P.2d 1192 (Utah 1984); and Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch,
589 P.2d 767 (Utah 1978).
Appellate courts give great deference to the trial court's findings of fact in divorce
cases and will not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. Kessimakis v.
Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1999). A finding of fact will be adjudged clearly
erroneous if it violates the standards set by the appellate court, is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or the reviewing court is left with "a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made" although there is evidence to support the finding. Cummings v.
Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah App. 1991).
As will be demonstrated in the next section Appellee Caroline failed to meet her
burden to produce competent evidence that she was entitled to an award of over $500,000
for the alleged interference by Appellant Peter in the sale of the North Parcel.
B.

When All of the Evidence Available to the Lower Court is Marshaled in
Support of the Findings and Judgment of the Alleged Deficiency, There is
Insufficient Evidence to Support Such an Award.

In order to challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the challenger "must
marshal all the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is
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insufficient to support the findings in question." Phillip v. Hatfield, 9904 P.2d 1108, 1109
n.l (Utah App. 1995). See also, Larsen v. Larsen, 888 P.2d 719, 723 (Utah App. 1994).
The lower court granted Appellee Caroline's Motion for Entry of Default on
October 2, 2008 and ordered that the non-related "certified contempt issues" would be
addressed on Tuesday, October 7, 2008, the time originally set for trial. (R. 2161-62).
On October 6, 2008 Appellee Caroline moved for the taking of "Petitioner's
Testimony In Support Of Default Judgment And Entry Of Supplemental Decree." (R.
2273). The motion requested that the court permit Appellee Caroline to provide evidence
"at the conclusion of the contempt trial on Tuesday, October 7th in order to assist and
permit the fair and equitable settlement of the estate". (R. 2273-74).
Also, on October 6, 2008 Appellee Caroline filed both a "Petitioner's Verified
Amended Trial Brief and a "Petitioner's Trial Brief." (R. 2170-2221; R. 2222-75). The
only discernible difference between the two "Briefs" is a notarized signature of Appellee
Caroline and her affirmation that "she understands the contents thereof, and that the same
is true of her own personal knowledge, except as to those matters stated upon information
and belief, and as to those matters, she believes the same to be true." (R. 2220).
The hearing held on October 7, 2008 was noticed for the purpose of the prior
certified contempt charges: failure to mediate, improper overnight visitation, and
delinquent child support. (R. 166-67). The Court stated, "The only matter before the
Court, as you know, is just contempt today," (Oct. 7, 2008 Tr. pp. 7-8). However, many
additional areas of testimony were allowed including evidence relating to the final
judgment and damages.
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Appellant Peter shall now marshal the evidence relating to the sale of the North
Parcel most favorably to the findings of the lower court and Appellee Caroline.
(1)

Marshaled evidence taken from Petitioner's Verified Amended Trial Brief.

"Thereafter, Isabel Coats and David Ward moved to schedule trustees'
sales of the North and South Parcels. Despite many viable offers to purchase the
North Parcel for at least $5,000,000, the actions of Respondent thwarted a sale.
The evidence will establish that the North Parcel could have been sold for a gross
price of $5,200,000, and that Petitioner was agreeable to such sale, so long as the
share of the proceeds attributable to Peter Coats (or the marital estate's) interest in
the property was escrowed pending determination by this Court as to an
appropriate distribution. Yet Peter Coats refused to close the sale under those
circumstances, and the North Parcel was sold at a trustee's sale on March 15,
2007, for a bid of $3,600,000 to Respondents relatives . . . (R. 2190-91)."
"North Parcel (South Jordan). This property was foreclosed upon, as set
forth herein, and the proceeds divided, as set forth above. This property was
acquired subsequent to the parties' marriage. Petitioner claims that Respondent
dissipated this asset by refusing to close a favorable sale prior to the trustee's sale.
(R. 2198)".
"Respondent caused the foreclosure of the North Parcel of the South
Jordan property to the financial detriment of the marital estate. While that
property could have been sold for at least $5,000,000, and likely, $5,200,000, the
foreclosure resulted in the property being purchased by Respondent's relatives for
$3,600,000, which is a loss, or dissipation, which Respondent caused of at least
$1,400,000. (R.2201)."
North Parcel (South Jordan). This was a marital asset, as it was acquired
subsequent to the marriage. Any monies previously received either by Petitioner
should be confirmed in her. However, pursuant to Petitioner's Exhibit 16, the
property was foreclosed upon and the trustee's sale netted $3,600,000. The evidence
is clear, however, that Respondent caused the prior sales to fail, including one for the
North Parcel for $5,200,000 {See, Petitioner's exhibit 98, addendum #2, to Real
Estate Purchase Contract). Had Respondent cooperated in the sale of the North
Parcel, the parties' proceeds therefrom would have been approximately as follows:
Total Sales Price:
Commissions & Cost of Sales (7%)
1995 Trust Deed, 1999 Note & Brad Smith
Attorneys Fees (see P16)
Sub Total
Michael Ward 9.82%
Balance to be Divided
- 2 equals
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$5,200,000.00
<364,000.00>
<1,610,210.97>
$3,225,789.00
< 316,772.48>
$2,909,016.70
$1,454,508.30

(R.2215).
"Because of the foreclosure sale to Respondent's relatives, Petitioner and
Respondent each received only approximately $931,000.00, for a difference of
$523,508.00, each which is the cost that should be assessed to Respondent and
paid to Petitioner as damages for Respondent's dissipation and contempt. That
sum should be paid to Petitioner from the sale of the South Parcel of the South
Jordan property as set forth below. (R. 2216)."
(2)

Marshaled evidence from October 7, 2008 hearing:
Examination of Caroline Coats by her counsel:
Q.

You indicated that at least the North Parcel of the South Jordan
Property was sold at trustee's sale on a foreclosure. Prior to that
foreclosure did you have a good faith offer on the North Parcel of
that prop—North Parcel of the South Jordan property from a Mr.
Hagen for $5,200,000?

A.

Yes. My counsel has received a copy of it.

Q.

If you would locate Petitioner's Exhibit 98, which is—it's in four
of six. (Id. at 52).
* * *

Q.

As to this real estate purchase contract Petitioner's Exhibit 98 did
Mr. Hagen and the purported purchaser, as set forth on the first
page, and Mr. Coats—or excuse me, did Mr. Hagen offer to
purchase the property for $5,200,000 in a counter offer, Addendum
No. 2 to that contract?

A.

Yes. Yes.

Q.

Do you know why this sale did not proceed?

A.

Yes, the buyer couldn't close on the property because of Peter's
refusal to cooperate to get it sold. (Id. at 55).

Q.

Who bought the North Parcel of the South Jordan property at
foreclosure sale?

A.

At the sale Peter's brother, David Ward, made the bid for
$3,600,000. However, it appears that all of his family—David's
children and his wife, all divided the amounts of interest that—
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interest ownership that they would have in it, so it looks like they
all purchased it.
Q.

So Mr. Hagen a few months before had offered $5,200,000 and
Mr. Coats' family members instead at a foreclosure sale got it for
$3,600,000; is that correct?

A.

Yes. (Id at 59).
* # *

Q.

Are you currently involved in any civil litigation regarding
Michael Ward?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Ask you to turn over back to—this is six of six—Exhibit 140. Tell
me what that is.

A.

It's the docket with the case where Michael Ward is suing Peter
and me.

Q.

Turn over the Petitioner's Exhibit 141 tell me what that is.

A.

It's the Complaint where Michael is suing Peter and me.

Q.

Michael Ward is Peter Coats' nephew?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What's the nature of the action, the civil action that he sued you
for?

A.

That he believes he's entitled to the proceeds—if the property is
sold for the $5,200,000 that he should be able to have 9.82% of the
$5,200,000

Q.

Versus the $3,600,000?

A.

Versus the $3,600,000. (Id at 62-63).
* * *

Examination of Appellant Peter by counsel for Appellee Caroline:
Q.

How come the North Parcel wasn't sold for the $5,200,000?
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(3)

A.

Because no one bid it high enough.

Q.

Mr. Hagen did.

A.

No, he did not. He would have purchased it. It was open for
anyone to purchase.

Q.

Well, we have a fully signed offer from him. Why didn't you
complete that?

A.

The difference between a signed offer and a closing—I've got
divorce decrees that are over here and are signed and signed and
signed. It doesn't mean I'm closed. (Id. at 155).

Marshaled Evidence from Petitioner's Exhibits introduced into evidence
during October 7, 2008 hearing:

Exhibit 98 is a real estate purchase contract for land with an offer by David Hagen
in the amount of $5,000,000. (See Appendix to this Brief). The original offer contained
six additional terms as contained in Addendum No. 1. The offer was made on February
13,2007.
A counter-offer was made by Peter Coats and Michael Ward raising the purchase
price to $5,200,000 as well as adding ten other terms or omitting terms of the buyer. The
counter-offer was accepted by the buyer on March 6, 2007 and an additional addendum
was made extending the due diligence time for the buyer to inspect the property. This
was accepted on March 10, 2007.
Exhibit 141 is a Complaint filed in the Third Judicial District Court by Michael
Ward against Caroline Coats Graydon and Peter Coats. (See Appendix to this Brief). A
portion of the Complaint reads as follows:
23. In the months prior to the trustee's sale, defendant Peter Coats worked
diligently to procure a purchaser for the property.
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24. In the weeks and days preceding the foreclosure sale, defendant Peter
Coats was the procuring cause of various offers of purchase. At least one of the
offers of purchase was to purchase only the North Parcel for $5,200,000. Plaintiff
Michael Ward and defendant Peter Coats accepted that offer.
25. Defendant Caroline Coats Gray don did not accept this offer.
26. In the weeks and days preceding the trustee's sale, both defendants
made proposals or demands for conditions for closing. Plaintiff told both
defendants that he would accept either set. Defendants never agreed on a set of
closing instructions and did not accept any offer. None of the offers to purchase
were ever accepted since defendant Caroline Coats Graydon would not accept any
offer. (P. 6 of Complaint).
(C)

Appellee Caroline Produced Insufficient Evidence In The Record To
Substantiate A Deficiency Judgment Of Over $500,000 From The Sale Of
The North Parcel.

A review of the prior evidence shows that the Appellee Caroline failed to meet the
standards of evidence required even in a default judgment. The evidence, taken most
favorably to Caroline shows Peter's active participation in the offer made by Mr. Hagen.
Peter added an additional $200,000 to the purchase price that would have been divided
with Caroline. He added additional conditions and terms that were readily accepted by
Mr. Hagen. The evidence shows that the offer of $5,200,000 was a valid contract subject
to the various conditions imposed by both the buyer and the seller.
It is undisputed that the sale did not go through. However, there is no evidence to
explain why the sale failed. A signed real estate contract is binding on both buyer and
seller unless there is an "out" provided. Appellant Caroline gives only mere conclusions
that "Peter did not cooperate" for this failed sale. It is common knowledge that many real
estate contracts are not closed because of various reasons including financing, title,
inability to meet conditions, and buyer's right to terminate after inspection. Mr. Hagen
did not sue Appellant Peter for non-performance that would have likely occurred had
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Peter arbitrarily failed to convey title. Interestingly, the lawsuit brought by Peter's
nephew even alleges that the reason for the failed sale was Carolyn's refusal to accept
terms.
In summary, it is unknown from the present record what events actually occurred
to prevent the closing of this sale. In no case, however, can this failure be imputed to
Peter causing a penalty of over $500,000 in Appellee Caroline's favor.
As a matter of law, the portion of the judgment giving Appellee Caroline a credit
of $523,508 should be vacated.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A
JUDGMENT AGAINST APPELLANT PETER IN
THE AMOUNT OF $240,220 FOR APPELLEE
CAROLINE'S ATTORNEYS FEES WHEN THERE
IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SUCH FEES ARE
BASED ON NEED AND REASONABLENESS
Statement of Applicable Facts
It is undisputed that attorney Brian Harrison originally represented Appellee
Caroline from April 2001 until August 2003. Attorney Alvin Lundgren was obtained in
August of 2003 and continued as her counsel until March of 2006. At that time attorney
Michael Mohrman took over the case on behalf of Appellee Caroline until July 2008
when Caroline's present counsel, Kelly Williams, entered her representation. Attorney
Bryce Panzer was also retained by Appellee Caroline to assist in collateral cases
involving real estate.
Finding No. 24 of the "Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"
states:
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